Demons, ants, giants and dwarves: the construction of Germany’s handling of the Euro-crisis in French political discourse by Bogain, Ariane
Citation:  Bogain,  Ariane  (2014)  Demons,  ants,  giants  and  dwarves:  the  construction  of 
Germany’s handling of the Euro-crisis in French political discourse. Journal of Contemporary 
European Studies, 22 (1). pp. 7-23. ISSN 1478-2804 
Published by: Taylor & Francis
URL:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2014.887890 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2014.887890>
This  version  was  downloaded  from  Northumbria  Research  Link: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/11382/
Northumbria University has developed Northumbria Research Link (NRL) to enable users to 
access the University’s research output. Copyright © and moral rights for items on NRL are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  Single copies of full items 
can be reproduced,  displayed or  performed,  and given to  third parties in  any format  or 
medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior 
permission or charge, provided the authors, title and full bibliographic details are given, as 
well  as a hyperlink and/or URL to the original metadata page. The content must  not  be 
changed in any way. Full items must not be sold commercially in any format or medium 
without  formal  permission  of  the  copyright  holder.   The  full  policy  is  available  online: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/policies.html
This document may differ from the final, published version of the research and has been 
made available online in accordance with publisher policies. To read and/or cite from the 
published version of the research, please visit the publisher’s website (a subscription may be 
required.)
Ariane Bogain 
Department of Languages, Northumbria University, Newcastle 
Northumbria University, School of Arts and Social Sciences, Lipman 029, 1, Elison Place, 
Newcastle Upon Tyne, NE1 8ST 
ariane.bogain@northumbria.ac.uk 
Telephone: 0191 227 3800 
 
Title: Demons, ants, giants and dwarves: the construction of Germany‘s handling of the 
Euro-crisis in French political discourse. 
 
Word count: 8,416 
 
Abstract: 
Since the beginning of the Euro crisis in 2009 a succession of one ―last chance‖ meeting after 
another has exposed deep rifts over the policies to implement in order to ensure the 
permanence of the Euro. From austerity measures to curb swelling public deficits put forward 
by Germany to European growth plans and solidarity mechanisms suggested by France 
disagreements have been deep and infighting widespread. The agreement of a new European 
treaty creating a tight fiscal pact, at the European Summit on 7 December 2011, brought these 
tensions to the fore, leading to a barrage of criticisms in France against Germany imposing its 
austerity agenda on the whole Eurozone. This article seeks to analyse how Germany has been 
portrayed in the French political discourse by focusing on the vast array of reactions to this 
new treaty. It will show a discursive struggle between three discourse types representing 
Germany as an evil force intent on dominating Europe, a virtuous ant unwittingly dominating 
Europe and an economic giant but a political dwarf. These discourses will show how 
Germany is trapped into past representations and how they reveal far more about France‘s 
self-image in relation to its neighbour than about Germany itself. 
 
 
 
 
Demons, ants, giants and dwarves: the construction of Germany’s handling of the Euro 
crisis in French political discourse. 
The 2007 sub-prime crisis led to a global financial meltdown, which turned into a sovereign 
debt crisis in the Eurozone (Van Riet 2010), starting with Greece which was rescued in 2010, 
followed by Ireland and Portugal in 2011, which were granted bailout plans involving strict 
fiscal measures aimed at reducing public deficits (Begg 2012). The debt crisis was 
transformed into a specific Euro crisis, when many investors worldwide started to doubt the 
permanence of the single currency, in view of the dithering and conflicting attitudes of the 
Eurozone leaders as to which policies should be adopted to prevent the Eurozone from 
collapsing under asymmetric debt shocks in a monetary Union that did not include fiscal 
solidarity between its members (Begg 2012). It has been widely reported that Germany and 
other Northern European countries have been in favour of reducing budget deficits and debt 
levels to restore credibility in the eyes of the financial markets (Hubner 2012), before 
envisaging any form of European solidarity mechanisms, such as the mutualisation of debts 
through Eurobonds (Hubner 2012). Meanwhile, countries such as France, Italy or Spain have 
advocated a mutualisation of risks, a European-wide growth strategy to compensate for 
national austerity measures and generally speaking more European solidarity (Kauffmann and 
Uterwedde 2010). It is against this conflictual backdrop that one ‗last chance‘ meeting after 
another led European leaders to adopt various plans designed to consolidate investors‘ faith 
in the Euro, whilst erecting safeguards to protect the Eurozone against further deterioration 
(Cohen 2012). These efforts to find a solution to the Euro‘s woes culminated in a new 
intergovernmental treaty agreed at the European Summit held on 7 December 2011, under 
which the Eurozone States pledged to adhere to a fiscal pact to maintain structural budget 
deficits under 0.5% of GDP and overall budget deficits under 3% of GDP or face sanctions 
(European Council 2011). 
The run-up to this December summit and its aftermath witnessed a flurry of criticisms from 
French politicians targeting Germany, seen as having imposed its views on the Eurozone. 
These criticisms against a domineering Germany had been simmering in France since the 
beginning of the Euro-crisis (Kauffmann and Uterwedde 2010) but they were brought to the 
fore by a vitriolic attack from Arnaud de Montebourg, who had just come third in the 
Socialist nomination process to be the party‘s candidate for the 2012 presidential race. In a 
radio interview on 30 November 2011, followed by a post on his blog (Montebourg 2011c), 
he accused Angela Merkel to be a new Bismarck bent on European domination:  
The issue of German nationalism is reappearing through the Bismarck-like policy (la politique 
à la Bismarck) implemented by Mrs Merkel. What does that mean? She creates confrontation 
to impose her domination. Mrs Merkel has decided to impose a German order on the 
Eurozone. It means German demands and diktats on what will remain of the Eurozone once 
the countries that cannot cope are expelled. 
This attack led to a myriad of reactions about the role of Germany in the Euro crisis, both in 
support of and against de Montebourg‘s arguments. This debate resurrected the negative 
German trope in French political discourse, so widespread after the defeat in the 1870 war 
and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine and even more so during the interwar period (Aslangul 2009), 
which represented a radical departure from years of political discourses being dominated by 
the Franco-German friendship theme (Jurt 2001). This study aims to contribute to an analysis 
of how Germany and its handling of the Euro crisis was constructed in French political 
discourse in the context of the new fiscal treaty, by investigating the discourse types, the 
discursive strategies and the linguistic structures implemented and what the discourses 
developed about Germany reveal about France‘s self-image. 
 
 
Theoretical and methodological framework 
This study is based on discourse analysis in general and more particularly the theoretical 
framework of critical discourse analysis. Following Foucault‘s seminal definition of 
discourse as ‗practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak‘ (1974, 49), 
discourses have been characterised as constituting reality by creating norms, allocating 
meaning, status and social grounding to social actors and shaping development between 
them. Discourses ‗are not about objects, they do not identify objects, they constitute them‘ 
(Foucault 1974, 49), as what is said about something becomes the basis of our knowledge. 
Discourse analysis is now a cross-disciplinary method to analyse texts and talks which shape 
our reality (Brown and Yule 1983; Coulthard 1994; Fairclough 1997; Van Dijk 1997). It is 
through discourses that we access reality (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002) and it is through them 
that reality is constructed and socially constituted. Discourse analysis does not have a unified 
definition and varies depending on the discipline, such as language use in Linguistics, 
cognition in Psychology or social interaction in Social Sciences (Van Dijk, 1997). A wide 
range of practice can be found, from a detailed textual analysis to the broad quest for general 
patterns in socio-cultural discourses, from purely concentrating on the text itself to focusing 
on the connection between the text and the social condition under which it has been produced 
(Keenoy et al. 1997). In this article, discourse, following Fairclough (1992), is defined as 
socially conditioned, i.e. a text in context and socially constitutive, in that it forms social 
identities and interactions (Fairclough and Wodak 1997).  
In terms of methodology this article draws upon the discourse-historical approach in Critical 
Discourse Analysis as developed by Wodak (2011), which studies discursive strategies 
through which political identities are constructed. This methodology goes beyond the purely 
linguistic aspect of a text to include historical, political, sociological and psychological 
dimensions when analysing a specific discourse (Wodak 2011). This study engages in two of 
the discursive strategies laid out by Wodak: Nomination, in other words the construction of 
actors through the way they are referred to and Predication, i.e. the attribution of properties 
and traits to actors. The analysis centres on the following overall research question: how was 
Germany constructed in the French political discourse in the context of the Euro-crisis and 
more specifically the new treaty of December 2011? This is subdivided into the following 
three questions: How was Germany referred to linguistically? What characteristics and 
features were attributed to Germany? What does Germany‘s nomination and predication 
reveal about France? 
The empirical source material of this study is French political discourse, defined as the oral 
and written speeches of politicians, as reported by the media, as well as the media coverage 
of the issues they raised, reactions and commentaries. Data was collected from the day de 
Montebourg launched his attack until the election of a new president on 6 May 2012, 
Francois Hollande, which marked the end of the Merkel-Sarkozy relationship, dubbed in the 
media ‗Merkozy‘, and a yet to be defined new relationship between the two countries. To put 
these debates into a broader context, data from two months before de Montebourg's outburst 
and two months after the election of a new president were also included. The sample of the 
French press covered the political spectrum in terms of Right/Left, Euro-enthusiasts / Euro-
sceptics and liberal / anti-liberal economically. It included the three main national dailies, 
Libération (Left), le Monde (centre-left) and le Figaro (right), the two economic dailies, les 
Echos and la Tribune, a selection of political magazines, l’Express (right), le Point (right) 
and le Nouvel Observateur (centre left), as well as a selection of online news websites such as 
Slate (left), Rue 89 (left), Mediapart (left) and Atlantico (right). Blogs from politicians active 
on the web were also used. All the resources were accessed online, which enabled the 
inclusion of numerous reactions from readers.  
A large corpus was created, which was analysed in three stages: a preliminary analysis to 
summarise the main themes provided in relation to Germany‘s handling of the crisis; a deeper 
content analysis to identify discursive patterns, focusing on the discourse types and discursive 
strategies used; the identification of linguistic-rhetorical strategies implemented. This led me 
to identify three discourse types which I will analyse in turn. 
 
Nomination and Predication strategies: Germany, from oppressor to clumsy giant. 
Establishing boundaries between insiders and outsiders has been shown to be the staple of 
identity formation (Rose 1995; Bauman 1990). Identity needs an Other to exist (Connolly 
1991) and that is why the delineation of the Self and the Other, the in- and outgroups, is 
always the first step in the discursive construction of collective identities. The construction of 
Germany through the nomination and predication discursive strategies, i.e. the delineation 
and labelling of the actors involved, saw a discursive struggle between three main competing 
discourses. In all cases, Germany was cast as the dominant Other, whereas France was 
presented as the weakened ingroup. However, the first discourse type presented Germany as 
intent on dominating Europe and France as surrendering, whereas the second one showed 
Germany as unwittingly dominating Europe through its economic strength whereas France 
could not compete  and the third one characterised Germany as an economic giant who would 
have been lost in the Euro crisis without France‘s help.  
 
Germany the oppressor 
In the first discourse type, Germany was constructed in such a way as to cast it as a ruthless 
oppressor determined to dominate Europe, through various discursive strategies. The first 
was the selective use of negatively connotated nouns to refer to the Germans, presenting them 
as the menacing evil Other by drawing on an imagery developed since the 19th century. They 
were constantly referred to as ‗the Krauts‘ (les Boches), ‗the Fritz‘ (les Teutons) and ‗the 
Prussians‘, all historically connotated in reference to the evil enemy invading France, starting 
with the 1870 war and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine through the First World War, when these 
words became staples of French war propaganda, and the interwar period when Germany was 
represented as the Prussian helmet-wearing hostile neighbour (Aslangul 2009). These words 
tapped into the past representation of Germany as the enemy, the ever menacing Other, and 
acted as allusions, defined by Wodak as ‗suggest[ing] and address[ing] negative associations 
and connotations without being responsible for them. Ultimately, the associations are only 
hinted at. The listeners/viewers/readers make them explicit in the act of reception‘ (Wodak 
2007, 213). Germany was not directly accused of being bent on domination but the words 
used in the nomination of this country implicitly did. 
Two other words reinforced the nomination of Germany as the dangerous Other, when 
Angela Merkel was compared to the ‗Valkyrie‘ and the adjective ‗German‘ (allemand) was 
replaced by ‗Germanic‘ (germanique).  These words also acted as allusions, based on the 
imagery developed since 1870 and in particular during the heyday of the ‗folk psychology‘ 
during the interwar period (Jennings 1999), which ascribed characteristics to individual 
nations. Jules Romains, a prominent French writer in that period, can serve to illustrate the 
two main characteristics then given to the Germans: irrationality, illustrated by German 
romanticism which had gone the furthest away from Reason and a love for order leading to 
authoritarianism (Romains 1933). Such a contradiction led to unpredictability, delirium and 
untrustworthiness. The word ‗Germanic‘ used to refer to present day Germany alluded to its 
rigidity and blind obedience to order and ‗Valkyrie‘, the epitome of German wild 
romanticism in France, to its irrationality, thus alluding to Germany being an unhinged 
neighbour, therefore a constant threat to France.  
This historical lexicalisation, grounded in the imagery from the period between 1870 and 
1945, presented Germany as the menacing Other ready to pounce on the ingroup. It 
reactivated old images still present in the French social imaginary and helped the speaker 
transfer negativity from the past to today‘s Germany. This lexicalisation was heightened by 
specific historical references pertaining to that period and all pointing to Germany not only as 
the enemy but also as an oppressor. The most prevalent were Bismarck, Nazism and 
Daladier. First, many references equated Angela Merkel to Bismarck and his ‗spiked helmets‘ 
(casques à pointe)  were a recurrent image to refer to Germany. In the French collective mind, 
Bismarck is the man who ‗stole‘ Alsace-Lorraine and humiliated France by having the 
German Emperor crowned in the Versailles castle (Aslangul 2009). The image of ‗les casques 
à pointe‘ became synonymous with German imperialism and savagery (Proust 2011). 
Germany was therefore clearly nominated as the attacking oppressor and France as the 
victim.  
Second, several historical references directly equated Germany with Nazism. Thus, austerity 
measures were presented as ‗imposed by this German government, just like Nazi Germany 
dictated its conditions to Europe between 1940 and 1944‘ (Forum Scpo 2012). Present day 
Germany was cast back to its Nazi past and its actions judged through this prism with 
constant references to occupied countries, for example ‗what Germany is imposing on 
European people, once occupied‘ (Forum Arrêt sur images 2011). The starkest image was 
found in the Germans being referred to as ‗Arbeit Macht Frei‘: ‗They have always been a bit 
―Arbeit Macht Frei‖‘ (Forum Figaro 2011d).  With its explicit reference to extermination 
camps, the Germans were cast as the ultimate oppressors. If presenting Germany as Nazis 
would suggest that the ingroup was presented as a innocent victim, this was rarely the case, as  
numerous references were made instead to the Vichy regime (1940-1944) and more 
particularly its collaboration with Nazi Germany, which changed the nomination of the 
ingroup from oppressed to willingly partaking in its own subjugation. This strategy can be 
illustrated by the following two extracts: ‗A large part of the French ―elite‖ has always shown 
some kind of (shameful) admiration towards Germany. It is no wonder that collaboration in 
40-44 was so successful (it had started well before the war)‘ (Forum Arrêt sur images 2011); 
‗Do you want France to conform with Germany at any cost (s‘aligne à n‘importe quel prix) in 
order to save the obsession with the Euro (le fétiche euro)? I keep telling you, this is 
following the example set by Vichy (c‘est du vichysme), supported by Maurras (amongst 
others) while the true patriots were in London fighting for a free and independent France‘ 
(Forum Quatremer 2011). As Vichy has become the symbol of abject submission to the 
enemy, the implicit message was that, just like in 1940, the French government was willingly 
letting itself fully dominated and controlled by the same foreign power. Another image drawn 
from the Vichy period reinforced this message, when Julien Dray (2011), a Socialist MP, 
condemned Sarkozy‘s speech about the future of the Euro, which was held in Toulon, using 
this historical reference: ‗It‘s in Toulon harbour that the French navy sunk itself (s‘est 
sabordée) when the German troops entered the free zone (la zone sud)‘, thus implicitly 
accusing Sarkozy of not following this example and accepting France‘s oppression by 
following Merkel‘s line. 
The final most prevalent historical reference continued the negative nomination of the 
ingroup by equating Sarkozy to Daladier, the French Prime Minister between 1938 and 1940. 
For example, the socialist MP Le Guen (2011) stated that ‗Sarkozy is a bit like Daladier in 
Munich‘. Many comparisons were found in comments from readers, for example ‗Countries 
like Greece, Italy and Portugal suffer, and Germany is in the vanguard (aux avant-postes) 
with our Daladier‘ (Forum Mediapart 2011). This referred to Daladier‘s signature of the 
Munich agreement with Hitler, along with Chamberlain, in 1938, which enabled Hitler to 
annex the Sudete area of Czechoslovakia and six months later the whole country. Historians 
may still debate on how wise this agreement was but it has acquired in France the status of 
the ultimate symbol of capitulation (Weinberg 1988). To apply it to Sarkozy suggested that 
France was not only utterly dominated in the Euro-Crisis but also lost its dignity in the 
process. 
The historical lexicalisation and references reactivated negative images about Germany 
which cast this country as a negative force bent on dominating the Eurozone and subjecting 
its members to its demands. If the outgroup was clearly nominated as the enemy, the 
construction of the ingroup oscillated between a country under attack and a country 
humiliated for not putting up a fight, or, even worse, partaking in its own indignity. A 
rhetorical analysis further revealed a vast array of metaphors designed to highlight 
Germany‘s domination and France‘s subservient status, with the same ambivalence between 
being a victim or a willing participant to its own domination. 
The most prevalent metaphors to predicate the two actors pertained to the military world. 
Typical military words included ‗diktats‘, ‗hegemony‘, ‗injunctions‘, ‗controlling body‘ 
(directoire), ‗stick‘ (trique), ‗schlag‘, ‗ultimatum‘, ‗control centres‘ (postes de commande), 
‗to be in control‘ (tenir les manettes), ‗to hold the stick‘ (tenir le gros bout du baton) and 
‗dictatorship‘ for Germany, clearly predicated as imposing its will, just like an invading army 
would. As for France, the military terminology highlighted both its subjugated state and its 
utter humiliation: ‗abdication‘, ‗capitulation‘, ‗selling off national interests‘ (bradage des 
interêts), ‗to be dictated‘, ‗subservient‘, ‗to be under someone‘s command‘ (aux ordres de), 
‗to be on one‘s knees begging‘, ‗to be under someone‘s heels‘ (à la botte de). France‘s 
subservience was reinforced by Master/Slaves metaphors. The images of ‗France is giving in 
to Germany‘ (La France se couche devant l‘Allemagne) and ‗France is working for its 
master‘ (la France au service de son maître) were both a recurring theme. As a result, France 
was shown to be following orders like a subordinate: ‗Mrs Merkel decides and Mr Sarkozy 
follows suit‘ (Hollande 2011); ‗In reality he bows to German wishes‘ (Le Pen 2011) ; ‗The 
French president has become the European lackey (valet) of the German Right‘ (Montebourg, 
2011b). France‘s subordinated nature was graphically summarised by various striking images 
reducing France to a liegeman (vassal) (‗Today France is the liegeman of Germany which 
makes all the decisions‘) (Forum La Tribune 2012)), a telegraphist (‗Sarkozy is no more than 
Merkel‘s telegraphist‘ (Forum Le Figaro 2011b)) or even a part of Germany (‗Nicolas, the 
American, has become Mrs Merkel‘s foreign minister‘ (Forum Figaro 2011d)).  
Some metaphors went further, by reducing France to an extremely obedient dog. Nicolas 
Sarkozy kept being referred to as a poodle, with its negative connotation of doing whatever 
its owner asks: ‗Sarkozy in his role as a poodle, just like Blair with Bush‘ (Forum Rue 89 
2011); ‗France behaves like mummy‘s little doggy‘ (La France fait le chienchien à sa 
mémère) (Forum Le Figaro 2011d). Not only was France a poodle but a particularly pathetic 
and weak one, made apparent through a lexical field typically used by dog owners to their 
beloved subservient pets: ‗Our president follows Angela Merkel in a pathetic way like a 
frightened little doggy‘ (un toutou apeuré) (Parti de Gauche 2011b); ‗France is turning into 
Germany‘s little doggy. Every time, France gives its little paws to get its little treats‘ (La 
France lève la papatte pour avoir son susucre) (Forum Figaro 2011d). This subservient status 
was also highlighted through metaphors belonging to the cycling world. They expressed how 
France was forced to follow Germany‘s lead, without being able to dictate the pace: ‗Despite 
his humiliation, Sarkozy accepts to trail behind Merkel‘ (Parti de Gauche, 2011a); ‗Sarkozy 
might pretend to control the Paris-Berlin tandem but actually he is sitting on the carrier of the 
German Right‘ (assis sur le porte-bagage de la droite allemande) (Montebourg 2011a). These 
metaphors were sometimes replaced by musical or writing ones to present Germany as the 
director / author who orchestrated every decision: ‗Germany truly sets the tone‘ (donne le la) 
(Koller 2012); ‗Sarkozy has followed the story far more than he has written it‘ (Koller 2012).  
All these metaphors culminated in sexual ones, with S&M and emasculating undertones, 
when Merkel was presented as the domineering figure in the Franco-German couple and 
Sarkozy as the humiliated partner: Sarkozy ‗dropped his pants for Merkel‘ (a baissé sa culotte 
devant Merkel) (Forum Figaro 2011b); Angela Merkel ‗wears the trousers‘ (porte la culotte) 
(Woodward and Newton 2012) and the French government ‗systematically gives in (se 
couche) to satisfy Germany‘s desires‘ (Forum Figaro 2011d). This led to the most famous 
metaphor traditionally used to refer to France and Germany, that of a ‗couple‘, to be emptied 
of its substance, so big the imbalance between the two countries had become, which was 
neatly summarised by this image: ‗If I could come up with an image about this unlikely 
couple I would say that one lives in the flat and the other one lives outside the door (sur le 
palier)‘ (Forum la Tribune 2012).  
All these metaphors can be characterised as a code strategy creating a network of interrelated 
terms all predicating the outgroup as the domineering Other bent on dictating its orders on the 
ingroup. As for the ingroup, it was presented as being so weak that its dominated status 
became an utter humiliation. Germany‘s negative nomination and predication through the 
historical lexicalisation and metaphors were reinforced by a third discursive strategy, the use 
of negatively-connotated stereotypes. 
As Van Dijk (2000) showed, the categorisation of people in in- and outgroups is not value 
free but loaded with ideologically based applications of norms and values. Attaching positive 
values to the self and negative values to the other are two well-known strategies of 
predication. Both were widespread through the use of stereotypes designed to predicate 
Germany as the ‗nasty‘ Other jealous of the ingroup‘s superior civilisation. The main traits of 
the interwar German ‗type‘, as expressed through Folk psychology, were found exactly word 
for word. Authoritarianism and rigidity were reactivated to portray Germany as the inflexible 
type, with ‗an authoritarian culture‘  (Todd 2011a), a country that will not change its mind, 
however wrong it might be, which cast it as a difficult Other to deal with: ‗This country rests 
on a particular culture based on the family. It has a quite authoritarian system with a single 
heir (à héritier unique). Hence its industrial efficiency, its dominating position in Europe, 
hence also its mental rigidity‘ (Todd 2011a); ‗these obsessions for austerity (obsessions 
rigoristes) are engrained in the German mind-set (la mentalité allemande)‘ (Forum Quatremer 
2012). Irrationality was also reactivated, with the explicit message that here was a country 
riddled with ‗a thirst for power‘ (une ivresse de puissance) (Todd 2011a), which meant that it 
could not be trusted, thus reactivating a third traditional stereotype: ‗History hasn‘t taught us 
that Germany is a reasonable country. Its particular spirit (genie particulier) is to stick 
stubbornly to its mistakes and to be irrational‘ (Todd 2011b). Finally, Germany‘s arrogance 
was also recycled: ‗A weakly managed France can lead to Europe breaking up and the 
resurgence of a strong arrogant Germany which despises its neighbours‘ (Forum Arrêt sur 
images 2011), making it a very dangerous and nasty Other who could not be trusted. 
A final element in these stereotypes was to attribute this nastiness to jealousy of the in-group 
who possessed all the traits that the Other could only dream of. A series of binary oppositions 
was implemented to present the Other as intent on dominating its vastly superior neighbour, 
as illustrated by the following extract: 
This German nationalism […] is based on a huge feeling of inferiority. […] Deep down, Germany 
cannot forgive France for inventing modern democracy 200 years ago, following the Enlightenment 
and the Revolution, at a time when it consisted simply of a patchwork of principalities where they 
didn‘t even speak the same language. […] Hostility towards France is something vital for the German 
elites. […] Germany was unable to find in itself the resources to exist as a Nation, it needed war and to 
hate someone else. This someone else was France. Therein lies the problem (Forum Figaro 2011c). 
The binary oppositions in terms of enlightenment / delirium, democracy / war highlighted the 
nastiness of the outgroup presented as riddled with engrained jealousy leading to a 
pathological desire to dominate and punish its superior neighbour, which cast the in-group as 
the beautiful civilisation attacked by its uncouth and aggressive neighbour. 
To summarise the first discourse type on Germany, the characteristics of the 
nominalisation/predication discursive strategy were as follows: through the rhetorical-
linguistics elements of historical lexicalisation, historical references, metaphors and 
stereotypes, Germany was cast as the nasty Other and France as the victim: on the one hand 
an arrogant jealous domineering outgroup intent on controlling Europe, just like it tried to do 
in the past, and on the other hand an utterly dominated ingroup who suffered humiliation by 
being unable to fight back or even worse by accepting its own degrading status. This first 
discourse type, due to the ferocity of its attacks, tended to dominate the headlines and the 
media coverage. However, it was challenged by a different discourse type which also 
nominated and predicated Germany as the dominant Other but this time not in a bellicose 
fashion. In this discourse, Germany was not seen as the nasty Other hungry for power but as 
dominating by default through its economic superiority.  
 
Germany, the virtuous ant 
In the second discourse type, Germany‘s domination was not bellicose but brought about by 
its economic excellence, which France was unable to follow. This discourse relied on the 
reactivation of a traditional stereotype when it comes to the Germans, their industriousness, 
which was positively compared to France‘s more frivolous nature, in a re-enactment of the 
Ant and the Grasshopper‘s tale. The negative stereotypes of discipline and rigidity of the first 
discourse were transformed into a positive predication of responsibility and seriousness: ‗It is 
a disciplined country where hard work is sacred (sacralisé) (Beylau, 2011); ‗You are 
hardworking (bosseurs) and serious‘ (Forum Figaro 2011d); ‗They (eux) are responsible 
people‘ (Forum Figaro 2011d). The use of ‗you‘ and ‗them‘ implicitly suggested that France 
did not possess these positive traits. Indeed, the ant-like quality of Germany was opposed to 
the more idle-prone France, using the grasshopper metaphor and a series of binary 
oppositions nominating  Germany as a virtuous ant and France as a frivolous grasshopper: 
‗The truth is, France is a grasshopper and Germany an ant‘ (Forum Figaro 2011c); ‗Germany 
is not like us. While we live on credit and spend like there is no tomorrow (sans compter) 
they (eux) spend their time saving and exporting‘ (Forum Figaro 2011c). Germany was 
therefore nominated and predicated as the good hardworking responsible ant whereas France 
was the frivolous irresponsible grasshopper who squandered its money.  
This negative comparison with the industrious Germans led to a discursive strategy based on 
self-flagellation, in which France was predicated as lacking qualities to compete with 
Germany, through its own frivolousness. Just like in the tale, when winter comes, in this case 
in times of economic crisis, the grasshopper cannot cope whereas the ant is safe and sound. 
This was made clear through a series of binary oppositions, based on comparing France‘s 
economic indicators with those of Germany and systematically presenting them as inferior: 
‗The competitiveness gap keeps widening. We don‘t play in the same category anymore‘ 
(Ménudier 2012); ‗Germany has succeeded in finding a place (réussi son entrée) in the global 
economy whereas France has found it more difficult‘ (Le Maire 2012). A device often 
implemented was the fact and figure approach, i.e. an accumulation of statistics all proving 
how far back France was compared with Germany. By using a non-emotionally loaded 
vocabulary, in contrast to the first discourse type, this approach removed any bellicosity in 
Germany‘s domination by presenting it as the natural consequence of its economic 
superiority and France‘s inability to follow suit. A typical example was the following extract:  
The fact that Germany is in a strong position politically and economically is easy to understand. The 
German economy represents 30% of the Eurozone GDP against 21% for France. […] The German 
GDP has increased by nearly 10% since 2005 against 5% for France. […] Since the launch of the 
Eurozone the debt level of both countries had progressed in a similar fashion. This is no longer the 
case: Germany is about to reduce its public deficits […] whereas France‘s debts will continue to swell‘ 
(Lechevalier 2011). 
Germany dominated, not because it wanted to but because it had a better economy and better 
finances. The self-flagellation strategy explained this domination through France‘s own 
flaws, which suggested that France had only itself to blame: ‗It [France] listened too much (a 
accordé une oreille trop complaisante)  to discourses which refuse to accept the world as it is‘ 
(Le Maire 2011); ‗When you are too deep in debt you are always in a weak position. But you 
can only blame yourself when you have been a grasshopper for decades‘ (Forum Figaro 
2011b). France was blamed for its own economic misfortune with self-accusatory examples: 
‗The German made efforts that our grasshoppers haven‘t made in the last few years‘. (Forum 
Figaro 2011c); ‗These two countries [Germany and Finland] have succeeded to do what we 
have been unable to consider! They have adapted to this new currency and to its constraints 
in order to use its advantages to the maximum‘ (Forum Slate 2011). This debunked the first 
discourse by putting the blame of France‘s economic woes into the French corner and 
absolving Germany of any will to dominate. Indeed, in view of France‘s failings, Germany 
was cast as dominating Europe by default: ‗Germany rules (dirige) Europe today because it is 
the leading economic power on the continent‘ (Forum Figaro 2011c); ‗He [Montebourg] 
would be better off (ferait mieux de) understanding that Germany simply has the power it 
deserves‘ (Forum Figaro 2011a). This explains why, in contrast to the previous discourse 
which called for France to refuse Germany‘s domination, in this discourse Germany was 
presented as a model to follow: ‗Let‘s see what they do well and let‘s work to reach their 
level‘ (Forum Figaro 2011d); ‗It would be better to be inspired by what the Germans, who 
work hard, do‘ (Forum Le Point 2011). Germany became a beacon to follow and its critics, in 
a reversal from the first discourse type, became jealous creatures who refused to face 
economic reality. 
Indeed, the critics of Germany were targeted through a negative lexical field aimed at 
presenting them as ‗simpletons‘ who did not understand the situation and looked instead for a 
scapegoat: ‗Simple souls (les esprits simples) need an enemy. It is far easier than sorting out 
one‘s problems‘ (Forum Slate 2011); ‗I fully understand that some French people are refusing 
to face reality but this is no reason to criticise (taper sur) those who are better than we are. 
[…] It would be better to look at one‘s own deficiencies and try to remedy them‘ (Forum Rue 
89 2011). Their arguments were dismissed as a smokescreen in order not to face the harsh 
reality: ‗The hegemony you invented is nothing less than the decadence of the other countries 
in the Eurozone‘ (Forum Le Point 2011); ‗The books (les comptes) have to be balanced, 
otherwise you are in trouble (c‘est le bouillon). This notion of a so-called authoritarian 
Germany is just fudging the issue (noyer le poisson)‘ (Forum Figaro 2011a). This discourse 
exonerated Germany of any wrongdoing by accusing the ingroup of shifting the blame onto 
others for problems of their own making. The vocabulary used was often derogatory or 
ironic: ‗It‘s the others‘ fault! This is a typical French attitude when we put ourselves in the 
shit (dans la merde) and we refuse to acknowledge it‘ (Forum Rue 89 2011). This predicated 
the in-group as ignorant, incapable of accepting responsibility for their own problems and 
vindictive towards the outgroup whose dominance was only due to the ingroup‘s weaknesses. 
Through positively connotated images for the outgroup and negative metaphors and lexis for 
the outgroups, this self-flagellation discourse was scathing for France, the Grasshopper, and 
presented Germany, the Ant, as a paragon of economic virtue. The outgroup was no longer 
nominated and predicated as the nasty domineering figure intent on ruling Europe but a 
victim of its own success who dominated Europe through the economic weaknesses of its 
partner who preferred to shift the blame onto Germany instead of facing up to the harsh 
reality. This self-flagellation discourse was challenged by the final discourse type which 
accepted Germany‘s economic might but refused to accept the idea that France was utterly 
dominated. 
 
The teacher and the bumbling giant 
In this discourse type, Germany was still nominated as the dominant one in economic terms  
but the ingroup appeared in a much more positive light as the country which helped 
Germany, predicated as ‗clueless‘, find the right path in the Euro crisis. To start with, this 
discourse accepted Germany‘s economic superiority but instead of berating the in-group, it 
re-asserted its standing through self-promotion and self-aggrandizement discursive strategies. 
In a reversal from the first two discourses, France‘s economic situation was presented in a far 
more flattering light, using an exceptionalising device to minimise Germany‘s economic 
domination. This entailed removing its exceptional export records in order to show that on all 
other aspects France equalled Germany or even performed better: ‗If we look at the reality of 
the economic situation of both countries, beyond this exceptional German result in terms of 
exports, the differences are not that great. Over the past 10 years there have been few 
differences in terms of GDP growth or productivity gains‘ (Lorenzi and Rückert 2011). This 
enabled to present Germany‘s supposed economic superiority as the tree that hid the forest 
and nominated France as an economically strong country.  
The second exceptionalising device was to focus on the long-term rather than the current 
situation and then cast France as having better assets than Germany: ‗In the long term the 
French economic fundamentals are as good as or even better than Germany. Our demography 
is more favourable, our geography is a huge asset as is our education system‘ (Le Maire 
2011). Instead of focusing on temporary factors like exports one should analyse the whole 
picture, as France‘s economic standing would then appear in a far more flattering way. This 
is why the conclusion reached was ‗Let‘s not have any inferiority complex towards the 
Germans‘ (Le Maire 2011); ‗We are still equal to the Germans and we need to do everything 
to remain equal‘ (Le Maire 2012). This discourse presented France as having nothing to be 
ashamed of compared to Germany. This self-reassuring discourse turned into self-
glorification when the issue of German domination was concerned, as France was predicated 
as having imposed its will on Germany, portrayed as a bumbling economic giant who might 
have had the strongest economy but who was a political dwarf with no vision. 
France‘s role was indeed glorified: ‗The idea that Germany, because it is the best pupil, has 
won all the political decisions (arbitrages politiques) is wrong. History will show that the role 
of France and Nicolas Sarkozy was decisive‘ (Baroin 2012). Using an inversion strategy from 
the first discourse type, military metaphors were used to highlight that France had imposed 
many decisions on Germany: ‗given in to France‘ (concéder à la France), ‗extracted by 
Sarkozy‘ (soutiré par Sarkozy), ‗French victory‘, ‗concessions agreed to‘ were recurrent 
images. This led to statements aimed to prove that France steered Germany in the right path, 
using the discursive strategy of self-glorification through lists of achievements. A typical 
example was the following:  
It is difficult to state that the reforms carried out since the beginning of the crisis were wholly decided 
(téléguidées) by Germany. The first Greek bail-out plan was extracted (soutiré) by President Sarkozy 
from Angela Merkel who had not understood at the beginning of the crisis that it would quickly affect 
the whole Eurozone. Similarly, the creation of the European stability fund to support the countries with 
the highest debts in the Eurozone was a ‗French victory‘, if war-like terminology is to be used (Les 
Echos, 2011). 
In this extract, Germany was implicitly predicated as ‗clueless‘ and needing France‘s 
insights. It reactivated an old stereotype regarding the Germans, that of ‗un garçon mal 
dégrossi‘ (Romains, 1933), a very strong but somewhat intellectually limited person. France 
appeared as a teacher who needed to be patient with a pupil slow to understand, which was 
made even more apparent in this extract: 
It seems to me, however, that Mrs Merkel […] was in 2008 against Germany guaranteeing the EFSM, 
in favour of punishing the sinners, against a fiscal supervision […], against the Commission‘s 
involvement in bail-out plans, […] against unconventional measures from the ECB […], against any 
control (ingérence) over German banks. […] But if you‘d like to think that Germany led the way (a 
conduit le bal), so be it (grand bien vous fasse) (Forum Quatremer 2012). 
The rhetorical devices of repetitions and anaphors were very powerful to cast Germany as the 
one which eventually had to change its mind through what was implicitly presented as 
France‘s superior vision. This list, along with the repetition of the binary opposition Merkel 
was against / then she was for, cast France in the very favourable light of a visionary and 
Germany as lacking political knowhow and needing to be led by France. Germany may have 
been the economically dominant force in Europe but politically France was leading the way. 
These rhetorical devices debunked the first two discourses and presented France as the co-
leader of Europe with Germany. 
France‘s leading role in the crisis enabled this discourse type to reassert the Franco-German 
couple, so derided by the first discourse and ignored by the second. The main theme was 
summarised by this statement: ‗We are dealing with the Germans as equals‘ (d‘égal à égal) 
(Le Maire 2011). Thus, ‗French ideas contribute to move things forward. […] There are 
French ideas, there are German ideas and at the end of the dialogue we reach a consensus‘ 
(Juppé 2011). A ‗shock and awe‘ discursive strategy was implemented, through the use of 
extensive lists and hyperboles to present France as a co-leader:  
What is essential is that without the Franco-German couple, the Euro would probably not exist 
anymore today. Thousands of hours of discussions, often difficult, led to (ont accouché) Greek, Irish 
and Portuguese bail-out plans. They led to creating the EFSM, then the permanent mechanism. They 
led to 23 countries reaching a compromise on a new treaty. […] It is impossible to deny that the 
Franco-German couple were firefighters (endossé les habits de pompier) and is doing everything it can 
(se démène) to save the Euro (Seux 2012).  
This typical extract showed France under the best guise, that of a courageous firefighter 
always ready to fight a new fire along Germany. This led to the conclusion that France and 
Germany were the joint leaders of Europe: ‗Today, just like yesterday, there is no alternative 
to the Franco-German relationship. These two countries are the only ones able to create a 
driving force for Europe (une dynamique européenne) through their history, their geography, 
their demographic and economic weight‘ (Caresche 2012). All the key decisions on the Euro 
crisis were the results of their joint efforts: ‗If truth be told, if France and Germany sought the 
support of other countries to reinforce their positions, it always ended up with a Franco-
German compromise they both supported (assumé solidairement)‘ (Caresche 2012). These 
typical extracts reactivated a traditional discourse harking back to the 1930s, the idea of 
France and Germany as the spearhead of European integration (Jurt 2001), which minimised 
the role of other countries and reasserted France‘s standing in Europe.  
This third discourse type presented a very different in- and outgroups. Through 
exceptionalising devices to minimise Germany‘s economic performances, self-
aggrandisement strategies based on hyperboles to reassert France‘s standing as well as binary 
oppositions to present Germany as needing France‘s vision, France was nominated and 
predicated as the clever country which steered Germany in the right path, each time 
overcoming its initial reluctance or opposition. Germany was nominated as the ‗best pupil in 
the class‘ economically but predicated as ‗dim-witted‘ when it comes to finding the right 
solutions for the Euro crisis.   
 
Conclusion  
This article has analysed the nomination and predication of Germany in its handling of the 
Euro crisis prior to and following the European summit in December 2011, when a new treaty 
on a fiscal pact was signed. Emphasis has been placed on the discursive strategies and 
linguistic structures used. Three discourse types were detected, as summarised in the table 
below: 
Nomination / 
predication of the 
outgroup 
Nomination / 
predication of the 
ingroup 
Rhetorical devices used Discourse type 
Germany is an 
oppressor intent on 
dominating Europe. 
France is a victim 
 
France is participating 
in its subjugation  
Negative historical 
lexicalisation  
 
Negative historical 
references 
 
Metaphors pointing to 
Germany‘s domination 
 
Negative stereotypes 
Germany the 
ultimate 
oppressor 
Germany is 
dominating Europe 
through its economic 
strength 
France cannot 
compete through its 
own flaws 
Positive lexicalisation 
of Germany 
 
Positive stereotypes of 
Germany 
 
Negative stereotypes for 
France 
 
Self-flagellation devices 
Germany the 
unwitting 
dominating ant 
for France 
Germany is 
dominating Europe 
through its economic 
strength 
France is not far 
behind 
 
France leads Germany 
to find solutions to the 
Euro-crisis 
Exceptionalising 
devices 
 
Self-boasting strategy 
 
Self- aggrandisement 
devices 
Germany the 
bumbling 
economic giant 
In all the discourses Germany was nominated as the dominant other, either through its desire 
to dominate or unwittingly through its economic achievements which made it the ‗best pupil 
in the class‘. It was predicated either as the ‗nasty‘ other in the first discourse or, in the other 
two, as the economically efficient non-bellicose Other. In all three discourses, today‘s 
Germany was presented through the reactivation of past representations dating back to the 
first Franco-German war in 1870. Whether they were negative (authoritarianism, arrogance, 
rigidity), positive (industriousness) or poking fun (the strong but slightly dim-witted 
Germans), the stereotypes used trapped the Germans into a dated and fixed representation. 
Present-day Germany was viewed through a prism harking back to 1870 and reactivating a 
latent social imaginary still very much intact despite 50 years of official discourses on the 
Franco-German friendship. France, in contrast, appeared dominated in the first two 
discourses, either through incapacity or even unwillingness to oppose Germany or through 
not being as strong economically, which put the country in a position of weakness. This 
position was greeted either with deep anger at what was perceived as national humiliation or 
with self-flagellation for having been incapable of keeping up with Germany. Only a minority 
view predicated France as being capable of steering Germany on the right path. Through a 
vast array of rhetorical devices the three discourses presented France in relation to Germany 
in three different ways: self-hatred, self-flagellation and self-glorification. This study 
therefore highlights that the construction of Germany was far more about how France saw 
itself than about Germany, which was reduced to past constructs. The different ways of 
constructing the ingroup strongly suggest that the Euro-crisis rocked France‘s self-identity 
and that its focus on Germany was a sign of uncertainty about its own standing and a desire to 
reassert oneself, through anger, self-flagellation or self-boasting. This study has built a 
foundation which should now be taken further in order to analyse the argumentation schemes 
behind these starkly different visions of Germany in order to determine the points of views 
from which they were uttered and the ideological statements they revealed about who was to 
blame for the Euro crisis. 
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